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Abstract 
Theoretical studies have suggested firm specific human capital and job matching as the 
major, but opposite, mechanisms through which employee turnover affects labour 
productivity. This study finds that the former dominates when turnover is high, while the 
latter dominates when turnover is low. The optimal turnover rate that maximises productivity 
is about 0.22 per annum. Bringing the observed turnover rates in the sample to the optimal 
level increases the average productivity by 1.1 per cent. The large gap between the observed 
and the optimal rate could be explained by the lack of decision coordination between agents 
in labour markets. 
1 Introduction 
It is widely acknowledged in the business community that human resources are an invaluable 
firm asset (see, for example, Business Asia, 1999; Business Times, 2000). Therefore, it is 
logical to assume that the flow of this valuable asset − employee turnover − will play a 
crucial role in firm performance. Indeed, firms (and employees) are burdened with turnover 
problems in both good and adverse economic climates. During economic upturns, employee 
churning represents one of the greatest difficulties in business management. For instance, 
during the “new economy” boom in the U.S., nearly a quarter of workers were reported to 
have average tenure of less than a year (Economist 2000).1 On the other hand, during 
economic downturns, trimming operating costs through job retrenchment in order to maintain 
a firm’s share value is a typical phenomenon. Nevertheless, downsizing is not a painless 
option for firms, as they are likely to suffer adverse consequences, such as low levels of 
morality and loyalty amongst the remaining staff. Moreover, firms also bear the risk of not 
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being able to quickly re-establish the workforce should the economy rebound more swiftly 
than anticipated. 
As a consequence, employee turnover has been extensively researched across a number of 
disciplines, including: psychology; sociology; management; and economics. Each discipline 
has its own focus and, accordingly, employs different research methodologies. Psychologists 
and sociologists, for example, are generally interested in the motivations behind quitting, 
such as job satisfaction, organisational commitment and job involvement (Carsten and 
Spector, 1987; Muchinsky and Tuttle, 1979). Empirical work in these fields typically 
involves case studies using survey data of individual firms or organisations. 
In the discipline of management study, high staff turnover has been of great and continuous 
concern (as typified by Mok and Luk, 1995, and the symposium in Human Resource 
Management Review, 9(4), 1999). Similar to the practice in psychology and sociology, 
researchers heavily draw on event, or case, studies. While reducing employee turnover is a 
managerial objective for some firms, the converse is true for others. For example, legal 
restrictions and obligations in recruitment and dismissal could prohibit firms from 
maintaining a flexible workforce size, a situation more common in unionised sectors 
(Lucifora 1998). The industrial reforms and privatisation in many developed nations were 
aimed, at least in part, at increasing the flexibility of labour markets.  
In contrast, economists focus mainly on the implications of turnover on unemployment. A 
strand of matching theories has been developed extensively to explain equilibrium 
unemployment, wages and vacancies (Lucas and Prescott 1974; Lilien 1982). National 
aggregate time series data are typically employed in this line of research. For recent surveys 
                                                                                                                                                        
1 High-tech industries as well as the low-tech ones, such as retailing, food services and call centres, experienced 
the problem. 
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on matching theories and their applications see Petrongolo and Pissarides (2001) and the 
symposium in Review of Economic Studies, 61(3) 1994. 
Despite turnover being considered crucial to human resource management and production, 
there is little quantitative research on the effect of turnover on labour productivity (hereafter 
“productivity” unless specified otherwise).2 This omission is possibly due to the lack of firm 
level data on both production and turnover. Moreover, firm level data are typically restricted 
to individual organisations, prohibiting researchers from drawing general conclusions.3 
Utilizing a recently released firm-level panel data set, based on the Australian Business 
Longitudinal Survey (BLS), this paper is therefore able to provide a new dimension to the 
literature.  The BLS data provide an objective measure of value-added, which is comparable 
across firms operating in a broad spectrum of industries. Conditional on firm level factor 
inputs and other firm characteristics, the impacts of employee turnover on productivity are 
investigated. The results suggest that employee turnover has a statistically significant and 
quantitatively large, but more importantly, non-linear effect on productivity. From the results 
it is possible to estimate the optimal turnover rate − the rate that maximises productivity, 
keeping other factors constant − which was found to be around 0.22 per annum. As the 
employee turnover rate is defined here as the average of total number of employees newly 
recruited and departed within a period, relative to the average number of employees over the 
                                                 
2 McLaughlin (1990) examines the relationship between turnover type (quit or layoff) and economy-wide 
general productivity growth, but not productivity of individual firms. Shepard et al. (1996) make use of 
survey data to estimate the total factor productivity of the pharmaceutical industry; nevertheless, their study is 
only concerned with the effect of flexible working hours and not turnover.  
3 For instance, Borland (1997) studies the turnover of a medium-size city-based law firm, Iverson (1999) 
examines voluntary turnover of an Australian public hospital, and Glenn, McGarrity and Weller (2001) focus 
on major league baseball in the U.S. However, all three studies do not cover the production aspect of the 
examined organisation. 
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period, the highest productivity is where about 22 per cent of total employees changed over 
the one-year period. The estimated optimal rate is much higher than that typically observed in 
the sample (the median turnover rate is about 14 per cent). Using a theoretical model, it is 
shown that the lack of coordination between agents in labour markets can lead them choosing 
a turnover rate far below the optimal level. The intuition is that the possibility for an 
employer to find a more productive staff (or an employee for a more rewarding job) is related 
to the rate of job-worker separations in other firms. Without sufficient information about the 
intended decisions of others, agents will make changes at sub-optimal rates. 
The empirical results also suggest that if firms bring their turnover rates to the optimal level, 
average productivity will increase by just over 1 per cent. These results have clear policy 
implications. For instance, if the observed turnover rate is substantially below the estimated 
optimal rate and if institutional rigidity in the labour market is the main cause of that, 
deregulation may be warranted. 
The rest of the paper is structured as follows. Section 2 reviews two main contending theories 
about the linkage between employee turnover and productivity, and formulates the concept of 
the optimal turnover rate. In Section 3 the econometric model and the data are briefly 
described. Section 4 presents the empirical results and Section 5 concludes. Appendix A 
provides details of the data, including summary statistics. Appendix B presents a theoretical 
model to account for the empirical findings. 
2 Theories of Employee Turnover and Productivity 
There are two main theories on how employee turnover can affect productivity. Firstly, there 
is the firm specific human capital (FSHC) theory, pioneered by Becker (1975). This asserts 
that if firms need to bear the cost of training, their incentives to provide staff training will be 
lowered by high turnover rates. The incentive will be even weaker when firm specific and 
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general training are less separable, as employees have lower opportunity costs of quitting 
(Lynch 1993). Consequently, productivity falls as turnover increases. Even if FSHC is bred 
through learning-by-doing, its accumulation remains positively related to employees’ tenure. 
As a result, a higher turnover rate will still lead to lower productivity. 
In addition to the direct loss of human capital embodied in the leavers, there are other 
negative impacts of turnover on productivity. Besides the output forgone during the vacant 
and training period, the administrative resources used in separation, recruitment and training 
could have been invested in other aspects of the production process.4 Moreover, high 
employee turnover could adversely affect the morale of the organisation. Using a controlled 
experiment, Sheehan (1993) records that the leavers alter the perceptions of the stayers about 
the organisation and therefore negatively affect its productivity. As a consequence, warranted 
(from an employer’s perspective) but involuntary job separation could trigger unwarranted 
voluntary employee departure − a snowball effect.5 
On the opposite side of the debate, is the job matching theory established by Burdett (1978) 
and Jovanovic (1979a; 1979b). The key insight of this theory is that firms will search for 
employees and job seekers will search for firms until there is a good match for both parties. 
However, the conditions for an optimal matching may change over time, leading to 
continuous reallocation of labour. For instance, a firm that has upgraded its production 
technology will substitute skilled for unskilled labour (for a recent survey on this topic, see 
                                                 
4 It has been reported that the cost of losing an employee is between half to one and a half times the employee’s 
annual salary (Economist 2000). 
5 During the economic downturn in the U.S. in 2001, executives in Charles Schwab and Cisco were reportedly 
cutting down their own salaries and setting up charitable funds for laid off staff in order to maintain the 
morale of the remaining employees (Economist 2001). Both companies’ efforts were apparently well 
received. Fortune (2002) ranked Cisco and Charles Schwab as the 15th and 46th best companies to work for in 
2001, respectively, despite Cisco was reported laying off 5,500 staff while Charles Schwab 3,800 staff. 
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Ahn, 2001). Moreover, established firms also need ‘new blood’ to provide fresh stimulus to 
the status quo. On the other hand, a worker who has acquired higher qualifications via 
education, training, or learning-by-doing may seek a better career opportunity.  
Regular employee turnover helps both employers and employees avoid being locked in sub-
optimal matches permanently. For instance, the estimated cost of a poor hiring decision is 30 
per cent of the first year’s potential earning and even higher if the mistake is not corrected 
within six months, according to a study by the U.S. Department of Labor (cited in Abbasi and 
Hollman 2000). 
Another factor that compounds the effect of turnover on productivity is knowledge spillover 
between firms (Cooper 2001). Knowledge spillover is more significant if human capital is 
portable across firms or even industries. Megna and Klock (1993) find that increasing 
research input by one semi-conductor firm will increase the productivity of rival firms due to 
labour migration. Finally, Borland (1997) suggests that involuntary turnover can be used as a 
mechanism to maintain employees’ incentives. In short, matching theory suggests that higher 
turnover aids productivity. 
Although FSHC theory and job matching theory suggest opposite effects of turnover on 
productivity, one does not necessarily invalidate the other. In fact, there is empirical evidence 
supporting the coexistence of both effects, albeit the effect of FSHC appears to dominate 
(Glenn et al. 2001). The two theories essentially answer the question of how to balance the 
stability and flexibility of the labour force. It is the contention here, that given that FSHC and 
job matching have opposite effects on productivity, there is a distinct possibility that a certain 
turnover rate will maximise productivity. A scenario, in which such an optimal turnover rate 
exists, is where productivity is a non-linear – specifically quadratic concave function, of 
turnover. 
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3 Data, Empirical Model and Estimation Method 
3.1 Business Longitudinal Survey 
The BLS is a random sample of business units selected from the Australian Bureau of 
Statistics business register for inclusion in the first year of the survey. The sample was 
stratified by industry and firm size. The sample was selected with the aim of being 
representative of all businesses (excluding government agents, public utilities and public 
services). The focus is on a balanced panel of small and medium sized businesses. After 
excluding businesses with deficient data records, 2,435 businesses are left in our sample. 
Summary statistics and variable definitions are presented in Appendix A. 
This data source is unique in that it provides firm-level data, including an objective measure 
of value-added, and structural firm characteristics. Moreover, individual firms are tracked 
over a four-year period from 1994/5 to 1997/8. The panel nature of the data allows us to 
investigate the correlation between firm characteristics and productivity, whilst 
simultaneously taking into account unobserved firm heterogeneity. 
Due to data inconsistencies however, focus is on a sub-two-year panel. Also, some firms 
reported employee turnover rates well in excess of 1 (the maximum value of turnover rate in 
the data set is 41!). Since the figure is supposed to measure the turnover of non-causal 
workers only, the accuracy of these high value responses is questionable. It is suspected that 
most of those firms that reported a high turnover rate might have mistakenly included the 
number of newly hired and ceased “casual” employees in their counting. In that case, 
considerable measurement errors would be introduced. There is no clear pattern on the 
characteristics of firms with very high reported turnover rates. Thus, observations whose 
employee turnover rates are greater than 0.8 (equivalent to 5% of total sample) are excluded 
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from the estimations. As the cut-off point of 0.8 is relatively arbitrary, different cut-off points 
are experimented with as robustness checks. 
3.2 The Empirical Model 
The empirical model is a productivity function derived from a Cobb-Douglas production 
function. Using capital-labour ratio, employee turnover and other firm characteristics to 
explain productivity, the regression model has the following form:6   
  20 1 2 1 2( / ) ln( / ) lnit it it it it it it i it i itln V L K L L T T u eβ β β δ δ= + + + + + + + +φW θZ  (1) 
where itV  is value-added of firm i in year t, and itK , itL  and itT   denote capital, labour 
(effective full time employees) and employee turnover rate, respectively. Employee turnover 
rate is measured by the average of new employees and ceased non-casual employees divided 
by average non-casual employees at the end of year t and t-1. Unobserved firm heterogeneity 
and idiosyncratic disturbances, are respectively denoted iu and ite . Wi is a vector of time 
invariant firm characteristics, including dummies for family business, incorporation, industry, 
and firm age and firm size at the first observation year. Zit denotes a vector of time variant 
covariates including employment arrangements (ratios of employment on individual contract, 
unregistered and registered enterprise agreements), other employee related variables 
(managers to total employees ratio, part-time to total employees ratio, union dummies) and 
                                                 
6 It has been verified that terms with orders higher than two are insignificant. Furthermore, if there are feedback 
effects of productivity on the turnover rate, one should include lagged terms of T in the equation and/or set up 
a system of equations. For instance, using U.S. data, Azfar and Danninger (2001) find that employees 
participating in profit-sharing schemes are less likely to separate from their jobs, facilitating the accumulation 
of FSHC. However, the short time span of our panel data prohibits us from taking this into account in the 
empirical analysis. 
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other firm characteristics (innovation status in the previous year, borrowing rate at the end of 
previous financial year, and export status).  
Equation (1) can be viewed as a (conditional) productivity-turnover curve (PT).7 The five 
scenarios regarding the signs of δ1 and δ2 and, thus, the shape of the PT curve and the optimal 
turnover rate are summarised in Table 1. 
Table 1. Various Scenarios of the Productivity-Turnover Curve 
Scenario Shape of PT curve 
( 0T ≥ ) 
Interpretation Optimal 
turnover rate 
1 2 0δ δ= =  Horizontal FSHC and job matching effects 
cancel each other 
Undefined 
1 20,  0δ δ> <  n-shaped Job matching effects dominate 
when T is small, while FSHC 
effects dominate when T is large 
1
22
δ
δ−  
1 20, 0δ δ< >  U-shaped FSHC effects dominate when T is 
small, while job matching effects 
dominate when T is large 
Undefined 
1 2
1 2
0, 0,
0
δ δ
δ δ
≥ ≥
+ ≠  
Upward sloping Job matching effects dominate Undefined 
1 2
1 2
0, 0,
0
δ δ
δ δ
≤ ≤
+ ≠  
Downward sloping FSHC effects dominate 0 
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A priori, one would expect δ1 > 0 and δ2 < 0, giving rise to an n-shaped PT curve. This is 
because, when turnover is very low, job-worker match is unlikely to be optimal as technology 
and worker characteristics change continuously. Hence, the marginal benefit of increasing the 
labour market flexibility overwhelms the marginal cost of forgoing some FSHC. As a result, 
productivity rises with the turnover rate. Due to the law of diminishing marginal returns, the 
gain in productivity lessens as turnover increases. Eventually the two effects will net out; 
further increases in turnover will then lead to a fall in productivity. 
In the case of an n-shaped PT curve, the optimal turnover rate is equal to 0.5δ1/δ2. The rate is 
not necessarily optimal from the perspective of firms, as competent employees may leave for 
a better job opportunity. Neither is it necessarily optimal from the perspective of employees, 
as there may be involuntary departure. In essence, turnover represents the fact that firms are 
sorting workers and, reciprocally, workers are sorting firms. As a result, the estimated 
optimal rate should be interpreted from the production perspective of the economy as a 
whole. Moreover, the measurement does not take into account the hidden social costs of 
turnover, such as public expenses on re-training and unemployment benefits, and the 
searching costs borne by job seekers, and for that matter, hidden social benefits such as 
higher social mobility. 
3.3 Estimation Methods 
Following Wooldridge (2002, p.252) the unobserved effects of equation (2) are treated as 
random, since the cross-sectional component of the data is a random drawing from the full 
population. Moreover, a fixed-effects approach precludes the identification of the effects of 
                                                                                                                                                        
7 The effects of turnover on productivity are essentially the same as those on value-added as factor inputs have 
been controlled for. 
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any time-invariant variables in the model. Consistency of this approach relies on the 
assumption that, conditional on all of the explanatory variables in the model, the expected 
value of the unobserved effect is zero. Hausman tests suggested that there was some evidence 
that this assumption might not be valid. If this is the case, it is possible to gain consistent 
parameter estimates within a random effects framework following the Generalised Method of 
Moments estimators suggested by Hausman and Taylor (1981), Amemiya and MaCurdy 
(1986) and Breusch, Mizon and Schmidt (1989). However, possibly due to a lack of across-
time variation in most of the explanatory variables, none of these methods yielded 
appropriate parameter estimates according to the Sargan criteria of appropriate moment 
conditions. 
4 Empirical Results 
4.1 Results of Production Function Estimation 
Table 2 reports the estimation results for the base case – the sample with cut-off point of 0.8 
– and also results for the full sample. For the base case, two models are estimated; with and 
without the restriction of constant returns to scale (CRS). The results indicate that the CRS 
restriction cannot be rejected, as the coefficient of log labour in the unrestricted model is not 
significantly different from zero. Accordingly, focus is on the CRS results for the base case in 
the following discussion (the middle two columns). 
The coefficient of log capital is very small. This is not surprising due to the use of non-
current assets as a proxy of capital (see Appendix A for details). This argument gains support 
from the negative coefficients of firm age dummies in that the under-estimation of capital is 
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larger for older firms.8 Since both capital and firm age variables are included as control 
variables, the mismeasurement of capital should not unduly bias the coefficient of employee 
turnover. 
The coefficient of the ratio of employees on individual contract is significantly positive. This 
is expected as individual contracts and agreements tend to be more commonly used with 
more skilled employees, and also because such agreements tend to be used in tandem with 
performance-based pay incentives. Although it is widely believed that registered enterprise 
agreements are positively correlated with productivity (Tseng and Wooden 2001), the results 
here exhibit the expected sign but the effect is not precisely estimated. Interestingly, 
productivity is higher for unionised firms and it is particularly significant for those with more 
than 50 per cent of employees being union members.   
The coefficient of the lagged borrowing rate is, as expected, positive, and significant. It is 
consistent with the theory that the pressure of paying back debts motivates greater efforts in 
production (Nickell, Wadhwani and Wall 1992). Manager to total employee ratio appears to 
have no effect on productivity, while the negative effects of part-time to full-time employee 
ratio is marginally significant. The latter result is probably due to the fact that part-time 
workers accumulate less human capital than their full-time counterparts. 
The coefficient of innovation in the previous year is insignificant, possibly due to the 
potentially longer lags involved. Export firms have higher productivity; highly productive 
businesses are more likely to survive in highly competitive international markets and trade 
may prompt faster absorption of new foreign technologies. Non-family businesses, on 
average, exhibit 16 per cent higher (labour) productivity than family businesses, whereas 
                                                 
8 If there is no underestimation of capital stock, other things equal, older firms are likely to have higher 
productivity due to accumulation of experience. 
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incorporated firms are 13 per cent higher than non-incorporated ones. The result signifies the 
importance of corporate governance, as non-family businesses and incorporated firms are 
typically subject to tighter scrutiny than their counterparts. Medium and medium large firms 
have 15 and 20 per cent higher productivity, respectively, than small firms.  
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Table 2 Estimation Results from Random Effect Models 
 Restrict CRS  Restrict CRS  Not restrict CRS 
 Full sample  Turnover<0.8  Turnover<0.8 
 Coef. Std. err.  Coef. Std. err.  Coef. Std. err. 
Log Capital-labour ratio   0.189* 0.009   0.188* 0.009    0.184* 0.009 
Log Labour       0.031 0.023 
Turnover Rate -0.016 0.027  0.182 0.113  0.169 0.112 
Turnover Rate squared -0.001 0.004   -0.418* 0.182   -0.399* 0.181 
Ratio of employment on   0.131*   0.025   0.133* 0.026    0.128* 0.026 
Ratio of employment on -0.006 0.031  0.004 0.032  0.001 0.032 
Ratio of Employment on 0.057 0.045  0.062 0.047  0.056 0.047 
Ratio of manager to total 0.095 0.076  0.098 0.078    0.144# 0.084 
Ratio of part-time to total -0.044 0.040   -0.075# 0.041  -0.055 0.043 
Union Dummy (1-49%) 0.031 0.025  0.026 0.025  0.022 0.026 
Union Dummy (50%+)   0.086* 0.038    0.082* 0.038    0.077* 0.039 
Family business  -0.163* 0.024   -0.164* 0.024   -0.166* 0.025 
Incorporated    0.135* 0.026    0.132* 0.027    0.130* 0.027 
Export   0.106* 0.023    0.103* 0.024    0.097* 0.024 
Innovation (t-1) 0.005 0.015  0.000 0.016  0.000 0.016 
Borrowing rate (t-1)   0.011* 0.005    0.011* 0.005  0.011 0.005 
Size: medium    0.154* 0.028    0.153* 0.029    0.116* 0.041 
Size: medium-Large   0.199* 0.052    0.191* 0.053    0.125# 0.075 
Age (less than 2 years)  -0.171* 0.050   -0.171* 0.051   -0.170* 0.052 
Age (2 to less than 5 years) -0.060 0.038  -0.061 0.040  -0.057 0.040 
Age (5 to less than 10 years) -0.017 0.032  -0.014 0.033  -0.013 0.033 
Age (10 to less than 20 years) -0.018 0.030  -0.022 0.031  -0.020 0.032 
Constant   3.282* 0.056  3.289* 0.058    3.229* 0.080 
Industry dummies Yes   Yes   Yes  
         
uσ  0.472   0.481   0.482  
eσ  0.301   0.297   0.287  
ρ σ σ σ= +u u e2 2 2c h  0.711       0.725   0.739  
Number of observations 4472   4249   4249  
Number of firms 2357   2311   2311  
2
31χ  test for overall significance 1295.21   1235   1194.84  
Note: * and # indicate significance at 5% and 10% level, respectively.   
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4.2 Employee Turnover and Productivity 
Focus now turns to the impact of turnover on productivity. The coefficients of employee 
turnover rate and its square are jointly significant at 5 per cent significance level, although 
individually the coefficient of the turnover rate has not been precisely estimated. The two 
coefficients are positively and negatively signed, respectively, implying an n-shaped PT 
profile. It indicates that, job matching effects dominate when turnover is low, whereas FSHC 
effects dominate as turnover increases. For the base case, the imputed optimal turnover rate is 
equal to 0.22.9 This figure changes very little even if the restriction of constant returns to 
scale is imposed in estimations. 
Although the coefficients of other explanatory variables for the full and trimmed samples are 
not markedly different, the same is not true of those of turnover rate and turnover rate 
squared. This indicates that the extremely large turnover rates are likely to be genuine 
outliers, justifying their exclusion. However, notwithstanding this result, the estimated 
optimal turnover rates are remarkably stable across samples with different cut-off points 
(Table 3), lying between 0.214 and 0.231, even though the coefficient are sensitive to the 
choice of estimation sample. Firms with a turnover rate higher than 0.5 are likely to be 
“outliers” as our definition of turnover excluded casual workers.10 Since the measurement 
errors are likely to be larger at the top end of the distribution, the effect of employee turnover 
rate weakens as the cut-off point increases. To balance between minimizing the measurement 
                                                 
9 Using 1,000 Bootstrap replications, 93.1 per cent of the replications yielded n-shaped PT curves. The 95 per 
cent confidence interval for the base case optimal turnover rate is (0.052, 0.334). 
10 As a casual benchmark, policy advisers working for the Australian Government are reported to have very high 
turnover rates, mainly due to long hours, high stress and lack of a clear career path (Patrick 2002). Their 
turnover rate was found to range from 29 per cent to 47 per cent under the Keating government (1991−1996). 
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errors on the one hand and retaining sufficient number of observations on the other, the 0.8 
cut-off point was chosen as the base case.  
Note that despite the coefficient of the turnover rate is individually not significantly different 
from zero (at 5 per cent) for the base case, which implies a downward sloping PT curve 
(scenario 5 of Table 1), the null hypothesis of an n-shaped PT curve is maintained for three 
reasons. Firstly, this variable is essentially significant at the 10 per cent level (p-value equals 
0.106), or at the 5 per cent level for a one-sided test.11 Secondly, the optimal turnover rates 
are very similar across different cut-off points and the coefficients of turnover rate are highly 
significant for the samples with lower cut-off points than 0.8. This means that the low 
significance of this variable in the base case is likely to be driven by measurement errors of 
turnover rates.12 Finally, the two turnover terms are jointly significant, and will necessarily be 
subject to some degree of collinearity. 
 
Table 3. Results for robustness checks 
 Turnover rate Turnover rate squared   
 Coef. Std. err. Coef. Std. err. 
Optimal 
rate 
Sample 
proportion 
1996/97- 1997/98       
                                                 
11 The results presented in this paper were estimated using STATA 8. The turnover rate variable becomes 
significant (p-value equals 0.0516) when LIMDEP 8 was used instead, but the magnitude did not change 
much (coefficient equals 0.185), and the computed optimal tunvover rate remained equal to 0.22.  
12 The reason of choosing 0.8 as the cut-off point instead of 0.5, is that this sample yields a more conservative, 
and realistic, estimate of potential productivity gains, as the lower the cut-off point, the larger are the 
magnitudes of coefficients. Given similar optimal turnover rates, the productivity gain is the smallest among 
samples with lower cut-off points. 
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Turnover<0.5 0.435 0.175 -1.001 0.422 0.217 0.872 
Turnover<0.6 0.411 0.146 -0.962 0.298 0.214 0.914 
Turnover<0.7 0.178 0.124 -0.385 0.219 0.231 0.938 
Turnover<0.8 (base case) 0.182 0.113 -0.418 0.182 0.218 0.950 
Full sample -0.016 0.027 -0.001 0.004 0 1.0 
1995/6 - 1997/98       
Turnover<0.8 0.153 0.084 -0.244 0.136 0.313 0.951 
 
Table 4. Estimation results by industry and firm size 
 Turnover rate Turnover rate squared   
 Coef. Std. err. Coef. Std. err.
Optimal 
rate 
Number of 
observations
Manufacturing  0.393 0.140 -0.821 0.226 0.239 1825
Wholesale trade 0.317 0.326 -0.711 0.550 0.223 792
Retail trade 0.834 0.301 -1.251 0.473 0.333 440
Small firms  0.398 0.144 -0.925 0.240 0.215 2082
Medium and medium-large 
firms 
-0.170 0.176 0.254 0.273 − 2167
 
The model is also estimated by industry and firm size (with the choices of such being driven 
by effective sample sizes) and the results are presented in Table 4. The retail trade industry 
has the highest optimal turnover rate of 0.33, compared to 0.24 and 0.22 of the manufacturing 
and wholesale trade industries, respectively. The retail trade industry also faces the greatest 
productivity loss from deviating from the optimal rate as it has the steepest PT curve. Figure 
1 illustrates the PT curve for three different samples (all, manufacturing and small firms). The 
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diagram is a plot of log productivity against turnover rate. The PT curve can be read as that, 
in the base case, increasing employee turnover rate from 0 to the optimal point (0.22), on 
average, raises productivity by 1.95 per cent. 
Figure 1. Productivity-Turnover Curve 
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The median turnover rate for the base case sample is 0.136, which is well below the optimal 
rate.13 A possible explanation for the large gap between the estimated optimal rate and the 
sample median is the lack of coordination between agents (employers and employees) in the 
labour market. For instance, when an employer is pondering whether to layoff an 
unproductive employee, he/she needs to consider the chance of finding a better replacement 
within a certain period of time. The chance depends on, amongst other factors, the turnover 
                                                 
13 The average turnover rate of the base case sample is 0.183. However, median is a more useful concept here 
because the average figure is dominated by the high turnover rates of a handful of firms. 
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rates in other firms. Without sufficient information about the employment plan of each other, 
agents will make changes at a rate lower than what would have been if information were fully 
revealed. In Appendix B, a formal model is presented to elaborate this explanation. Another 
plausible explanation is that there is an enormous amount of friction in the dismissal and 
hiring process, such as legal restrictions. Yet another possible explanation is that employers 
may be concerned about non-pecuniary compensation, such as a harmonious working 
environment, which may or may not sufficiently compensate for inferior job matching. This 
scenario is likely to be important for small and medium sized firms, which characterise the 
BLS data. 
While the finding cannot pin down exactly what factors attribute to the gap, it indicates how 
much can be gained by bringing the turnover rate towards the optimal level. The average 
productivity gain from closing the gap is equal to 1.1 per cent, which is the average increment 
of productivity for the firms in the base sample if their turnover rates shift from observed to 
the optimal values, weighted by the firms’ value added.14 Given that the steepest of the PT 
curve increases with lower cut-off point, 1.1 per cent should be viewed as a lower bound 
value. 
Note that as the analysis in this paper is based on small and medium firms, it is not possible 
to draw inferences to the population of all firms. Very large firms typically consist of many 
sub-units, which could all be considered smaller “firms”. Therefore, within-firm mobility 
                                                 
14 Note that there is the possibility that lower productivity might lead to payroll retrenchment. However, if so, 
this is likely to have an impact on staffing decisions with lags (for example, due to uncertainty in 
distinguishing cyclical effects from long run declines in productivity, and measurement error in identifying 
individual worker’s productivity in team production). Since the estimations use contemporaneous turnover 
and productivity figures, any potential endogeneity will be alleviated. 
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may substitute between-firm mobility.15 Also, it is not possible to test the potential long-term 
effects of turnover on productivity here due to data restrictions. For instance, unfavourable 
comments on a firm spread by its involuntarily separated employees may damage its 
corporate image and, thus, weaken its attraction to quality potential employees. Therefore, 
employee turnover may have slightly stronger negative effect in the long run. However, this 
reputation effect should not be significant for small and medium firms because of their 
relative size in the labour market. To examine this long run effect (as well as any potential 
reverse causation effect discussed in footnoted 11) requires the use of a longer panel. 
5 Conclusions 
This paper sets out to quantify the impact of employee turnover on productivity. Of the two 
major theoretical arguments, FSHC theory asserts that high turnover lowers firms’ incentives 
to provide staff training programs and consequently, reduces productivity. On the other hand, 
job matching theory postulates that turnover can help employers and employees avoid being 
locked in sub-optimal matches permanently, and therefore increases productivity. The 
conflict between retaining workforce stability on the one hand, and flexibility on the other, 
gives rise to the potential existence of an “optimal” turnover rate. 
Using an Australian longitudinal data set, productivity was found to be a quadratic function 
of turnover. The n-shaped PT curve is consistent with the intuition that job matching effects 
dominate while turnover is low, whereas FSHC effects dominate while turnover is high. The 
optimal turnover rate is estimated to be about 0.22. This result was robust to both estimation 
method and sample (with the possible exception of the retail trade sector). 
                                                 
15 In a case study, Lazear (1992) finds that the pattern of within-firm turnover from job to job resembles that of 
between-firm turnover. 
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The fact that the estimated optimal rate is much higher than the sample median of 0.14 raises 
questions about whether there are institutional rigidities hindering resource allocation in the 
labour market. Using a theoretical model, it is shown that the large turnover gap can be 
explained by the lack of decision coordination between agents in the market. The empirical 
results also indicate that higher productivity can be gained from narrowing this gap - average 
productivity increase was estimated to be at least 1.1 per cent if the turnover rates across the 
sampled firms are brought to the optimal level. 
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Appendix A: The Working Sample and Variable Definitions 
The first wave of BLS was conducted in 1994/5, with a total effective sample size of 8,745 
cases. The selection into the 1995/6 sample was not fully random.  Businesses that had been 
innovative in 1994/95, had exported goods or services in 1994/95, or had increased 
employment by at least 10 per cent or sales by 25 per cent between 1993/94 and 1994/95, 
were included in the sample. A random selection was then made on all remaining businesses. 
These businesses were traced in the surveys of the subsequent two years. In order to maintain 
the cross-sectional representativeness of each wave, a sample of about 800 businesses were 
drawn from new businesses each year. The sample size in the second, third and fourth waves 
are around 5,600. For detailed description of the BLS data set, see Tseng and Wooden 
(2001). Due to confidentiality considerations, the complete BLS is not released to the public, 
only the Confidentialised Unit Record File (CURF) is available. In the CURF, businesses 
exceed 200 employees and another 30 businesses that are regarded as large enterprises using 
criteria other than employment are excluded. This leaves around 4,200 businesses in the 
balanced panel.  
Deleting observations that had been heavily affected by imputation, as their inclusion would 
impose artificial stability, further reduced the number of cases available for analysis. 
Moreover, businesses in the finance and insurance industries were excluded because of 
substantial differences in the measures of value-added and capital for these firms (and 
effective sample sizes too small to undertake separate analyses on these groups). In addition, 
observations with negative sales and negative liabilities were dropped, as were a small 
number of cases where it was reported that there were no employees. In total, this left just 
2,435 businesses in our sample. Summary statistics are presented in Table A.  
The dependent and explanatory variables are briefly described as follows: 
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• ln itV  (log value-added): Value-added is defined as sales − purchase + closing stock − 
opening stock, in financial year t. 
• ln itK  (log capital): Capital is measured as the total book value of non-current assets plus 
imputed leasing capital. As reported in Rogers (1999), the importance of leasing capital 
relative to owned capital varies significantly with firm size and industry, suggesting that 
leasing capital should be included if we are to accurately approximate the total value of 
capital employed in the production process. Leasing capital is imputed from data on the 
estimated value of rent, leasing and hiring expenses.16 
• ln itL  (log labour): Labour input is measured as the number of full-time equivalent 
employees.17 Since employment is a point in time measure, measured at the end of the 
survey period (the last pay period in June of each year), we use the average numbers of 
full-time equivalent employees in year t and year t-1 for each business as their labour 
input in year t.18 
• itT  (employee turnover rate): Employee turnover rate is measured by the average of new 
employees and ceased non-casual employees divided by average non-casual employees at 
the end of year t and t-1. The variables are only available from 1995/6 onwards. 
                                                 
16 Leasing capital is imputed using the following formula: leasing capital = leasing expenses/(0.05+r). The 
depreciation rate of leasing capital is assumed to be 0.05. Ten-year Treasury bond rate is used as the discount 
rate (r). See Rogers (1999) for more detailed discussion. 
17 The BLS only provides data on the number of full-time and part-time employees while the number of work 
hours is not available. The full-time equivalent calculation is thus based on estimated average work hours of 
part-time and full-time employees for the workforce as a whole, as published by the ABS in its monthly 
Labour Force publication (cat. no. 6203.0). 
18 Capital is also a point in time measure. However, capital is far less variable than labour (especially when 
measured in terms of its book value), and hence the coefficient of capital is not sensitive to switching between 
flow and point-in-time measures. 
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Moreover, the questions for the calculation of labour turnover rate are slightly different in 
1995/6 questionnaires. 
• iW  (time invariant control variables): 
- Firm age dummies: this variable is to control for any bias associated with the 
mismeasurement of capital, as well as to control for industry specific knowledge.19 
- Industry dummies: industry dummies are included to control for industry specific 
factors that may not be captured by the above variables. 
• itZ  (time variant control variables): 
- Employment arrangement: there are three variables included in the regression  
proportion of employees covered by individual contracts, by registered enterprise 
agreements, and by unregistered enterprise agreements. The proportion of employees 
covered by award only is omitted due to perfect multi-collinearity.  
- Union dummies: these dummies indicate whether a majority or a minority of 
employees are union members, respectively. A majority is defined as more than 50 
per cent and a minority being more than zero but less than 50 per cent. The reference 
category is businesses without any union members at all. 
- Part-time employee to total employee ratio and manager to total employee ratio: the 
effect of manager to total employee ratio is ambiguous because a higher ratio implies 
employees being better monitored on the one hand, while facing more red tape on the 
                                                 
19 A source of measurement bias is the use of the book value of non-current assets. Using the book value will, in 
general, lead to the underestimation of the true value of capital due to the treatment of depreciation. As firms get 
older, the book value of capital is generally depreciated at a rate greater than the diminution in the true value of 
the services provided by the capital stock. 
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other. The effect of part-time to total employee ratio is also ambiguous because part-
timers may be more efficient due to shorter work hours, but they may be less 
productive due to less accumulation of human capital. 
- A dummy variable that indicates whether a business was “innovative” in the previous 
year: Innovation potentially has a long lag effect on productivity. Since the panel is 
relatively short, in order to avoid losing observations, we include only a one-year lag. 
Moreover, the definition of innovation is very board in the BLS. The coefficient of 
innovation dummy is expected to be less significant than it should be. 
- Dummy variables that indicate whether a business is a family business, or an 
incorporated enterprise. The questions are asked at the first wave of the survey, so 
both variables are time invariant.  
- Borrowing rate: It is measured at the end of the previous financial year. This variable 
is used to measure how highly geared a firm is. 
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Table A: Summary statistics 
 Full sample Trimmed sample 
Variable Mean Std. Dev. Mean Std. Dev. 
Log labour productivity 4.281 0.695 4.289 0.694 
Log Capital-labour ratio 3.968 1.091 3.972 1.086 
Log Labour 2.823 1.119 2.845 1.114 
Turnover Rate 0.252 0.470 0.183 0.181 
Ratio of Employment on individual 
contract 
0.251 0.365 0.254 0.367 
Ratio of Employment on Unregistered 
agreement 
0.085 0.249 0.084 0.248 
Ratio of Employment on Registered 
agreement 
0.068 0.218 0.069 0.218 
Manager to total employee ratio 0.255 0.169 0.252 0.168 
Ratio of part-time to total employee 0.202 0.282 0.195 0.276 
Union Dummy (1-49%) 0.206 0.405 0.209 0.407 
Union Dummy (50%+) 0.079 0.270 0.082 0.274 
Family business 0.514 0.500 0.512 0.500 
Incorporated  0.715 0.451 0.717 0.450 
Export 0.271 0.444 0.272 0.445 
Innovation (t-1) 0.292 0.455 0.293 0.455 
Borrowing rate (t-1) 0.746 1.395 0.746 1.397 
Medium  0.443 0.497 0.445 0.497 
Medium-Large 0.066 0.248 0.065 0.247 
Age (less than 2) 0.062 0.241 0.062 0.241 
Age (2 to less than 5 years) 0.129 0.335 0.129 0.335 
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Age (5 to less than 10 years) 0.248 0.432 0.248 0.432 
Age (10 to less than 20 years) 0.288 0.453 0.287 0.453 
Age (20 years+) 0.274 0.446 0.275 0.446 
Mining 0.008 0.088 0.008 0.088 
Manufacturing 0.428 0.495 0.430 0.495 
Construction 0.043 0.203 0.042 0.201 
Wholesale trade 0.181 0.385 0.186 0.389 
Retail trade 0.107 0.309 0.104 0.305 
Accommodations, cafes & restaurants 0.036 0.186 0.033 0.180 
Transport & storage 0.029 0.169 0.029 0.168 
Finance & insurance 0.013 0.113 0.012 0.111 
Property & business services 0.118 0.323 0.119 0.324 
Cultural & recreational services 0.018 0.133 0.017 0.128 
Personal & other services 0.019 0.137 0.019 0.138 
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Appendix B: A Simple Model of Optimal Turnover Rate and Coordination 
The objective of developing this model is to provide a theoretical explanation for the 
empirical finding in the main text. The model is not supposed to exhaust all possible 
explanations. It focuses on only one element, namely the coordination problem between 
firms.20 This element alone, as shown below, is sufficient to account for the apparently large 
gap between the estimated optimal turnover rate and the sample median rate. 
The model focuses on the steady state optimal employee turnover rate for a representative 
firm. Therefore, it abstracts from adjustment issues. To simplify the analysis, we make a 
number of assumptions: 
(a) All separations are initiated and controlled by the firm. So there is no employee 
churning. As explained later, churning can be modelled separately using a similar 
framework. 
(b) Production uses a Cobb-Douglas technology with a fixed capital to labour ratio for 
both incumbents and newcomers. All workers use the same type of capital. 
(c) The real wages received by both types of worker are fixed. 
(d) The degree of job matching is random so that a worker who matches a vacancy in one 
firm does not necessarily match the vacancies in other firms equally well. As a result, 
firms are not competing with each other, and all firms benefit from having a larger 
pool of job seekers. 
(e) In every period the firm lays off a certain proportion of incumbents, in the hope of 
replacing them with better-matched workers. 
                                                 
20 One can formulate similar arguments using the notion of imperfect information in the labour market and risk 
adverseness of agents. 
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(f) All incumbents are identical and have the equal chance of being laid off. Therefore, in 
terms of FSHC, there is a difference between incumbents and newcomers but not 
amongst incumbents themselves. As a consequence, the output of incumbents depends 
only on their average tenure but not on the distribution of tenures.21 
The total number of staff for a representative firm, N, is normalized to one: 
 1 I H LN N N N= = + −  (2) 
where IN  is the number of incumbents; HN  the number of newly hired staff; LN  the number 
of incumbents being laid off in each period. In steady state, the total number of staff remains 
constant, implying that H LN N= . 
The turnover rate is 
 
2
H L
H
N N N
N
θ += = . (3) 
Given that the total number of staff is normalized to one and the capital to labour ratio is 
constant, it implies that the capital stock is fixed. Therefore, the profit of the firm can be 
written as a function of labour input: 
 ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )
2I L H I I L H H H L
cA N N B N w N N w N N Nλ λπ = − + − − − − +  (4) 
where A is the productivity factor of incumbents; B the productivity factor of newcomers; Iw  
and Hw  are the real wage rates for incumbents and newcomers, respectively; c/2 the real cost 
of hiring and laying off staff. Output price is normalized to one. 
                                                 
21 A possible justification for this assumption is that FSHC reaches its satiation level within a short tenure, so 
that all incumbents are very similar. 
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The amount of FSHC an average incumbent can accumulate is negatively related to the 
chance that she will be laid off in any given period and, thus, to the turnover rate. Here we 
specify the productivity factor of incumbents as 
 (1 )A ασ θ= −  (5) 
where σ is a positive coefficient, and its value is positively related to the stock of capital. A 
larger value of α represents a greater FSHC effect. 
The productivity factor of newcomers is not a constant. The firm will try to select candidates 
with a better job-match than an average incumbent. Otherwise, there would be no gain to lay 
off experienced staff and find an inexperienced replacement. The average productivity of a 
newcomer depends on the size of the pool of talent from which firms can pick their 
candidates.22 If all firms are identical, then the size of the pool will be positively related to the 
turnover rate in a representative firm. We specify an ad hoc relationship between them as 
 B βσθ= . (6) 
The specifications of A and B have the same coefficient σ, because if there are not FSHC and 
job matching effects, incumbents and freshmen are identical. A larger value of β represents a 
greater job-matching effect. It is assumed that 1λ α+ <  and 1λ β+ < .23 
If there is no coordination between firms, each firm will treat B as a constant rather than a 
function of θ. In the followings, we consider the two cases that firms do not coordinate and 
coordinate, respectively. 
Without coordination, the problem faced by the firm can be formulated as: 
                                                 
22 Here we implicitly assume that searching cost is independent of the pool size. 
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 max (1 ) 'IB w c
λ α λ
θ π σ θ θ θ+= − + − −  (7) 
where ' H Ic c w w= + −  is the net cost of turnover. 
The profit maximizing turnover rate θ  is given by 
 1 1( )(1 ) '/ 0cλ α λ βλ α θ λθ σ+ − + −+ − − + =  . (8) 
Consider 1 1( ) ( )(1 ) '/x cα λ βθ λ α θ λθ σ− + −= + − − + , which has the following properties: (1) 
'( ) 0x θ > ; (2) ( )x θ → −∞  as 0θ →  and; (3) ( )x θ →∞  as 1θ → . So there must exist a 
solution θ  for (8) such that (0,1)θ ∈ . 
With coordination, the firm treats B as an endogenous variable, and its problem is 
reformulated as: 
 max (1 ) 'Iw c
λ α λ β
θ π σ θ σθ θ+ += − + − −  (9) 
The profit-maximizing turnover rate *θ  is given by 
 * 1 * 1( )(1 ) ( ) '/ 0cλ α λ βλ α θ λ β θ σ+ − + −+ − − + + = . (10) 
By comparing (8) and (10), it is easy to work out that *θ θ>  . This is because the marginal 
revenue is decreasing in θ , while the marginal cost is constant. With coordination, at the 
point θ θ=  , the marginal revenue is greater than the marginal cost by an amount equal to 
1λ βσβθ + − . So the turnover rate under coordination must be greater than θ . 
Using (8) and (10), it can be worked out that 
                                                                                                                                                        
23 These two inequalities are sufficient but not necessary conditions for an interior solution of the profit-
maximizing turnover rate to exist within [0,1]. 
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Equations (11) and (12) imply that a greater FSHC effect will expectedly lower the turnover 
rate under both scenarios. However, the impact of a greater FSHC effect on the gap between 
*θ  and θ  is ambiguous. Equations (13) and (14) suggest that a higher net cost of turnover 
will, also expectedly, reduce the turnover rate for both scenarios; nevertheless, the effect on 
the gap between *θ  and θ  is ambiguous. 
The more important result is from (15) and (16). The two equations asset that a greater job-
matching effect will lower the turnover rate in the scenario of no coordination but raise that in 
the opposite scenario. Consequently, the gap between *θ  and θ  will widen with greater job-
matching effect.  The intuition of the result is that, when all firms increase their turnover 
rates, the probability for each firm to find a worker with a better job-match to fill a vacancy is 
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also higher. A greater job-matching effect will give firms more incentives to initiate 
departures under coordination. 
Using Taylor expansions, it can be shown that 1(1 ) 1 (1 )λ αθ λ α θ+ −− ≈ + − − , 
1 (2 ) (1 )λ βθ λ β λ β θ+ − ≈ − − − − − . Also, using the fact that all θ , β  and (1 )λ β− −  are 
small, it can be stated that (1 ) 0β λ β θ− − ≈ . Applying these to (8) and (10), we can obtain 
 * (2 )
( )(1 ) ( )(1 )
β λ βθ θ λ α λ α λ β λ β
− −− ≈ + − − + + − −
 . (17) 
In this equation, λ represents the effect of “pure” labour input, α the effect of FSHC, and β 
the effect of job matching. 
In our empirical study, the sample median is 0.14. This figure corresponds to the case that 
firms and workers cannot coordinate their decisions, as each individual agent is atomic in the 
labour market. On the other hand, the estimated optimal turnover rate is about 0.22. This is 
the figure that a central planner will choose. Therefore, it corresponds to the case that agents 
can coordinate their decisions. If all turnovers were initiated by firms and profit are highly 
correlated to labour productivity, the empirical finding suggests that *θ θ−   is in the order of 
0.08 (= 0.22 – 0.14). The value of equation (17) is much less sensitive to the values of λ and 
α than to that of β. Thus, we arbitrarily set λ = 0.7 and α = 0.02.24 The figures indicate a very 
small FSHC effect relative to the pure labour effect. As β increases from 0.01 to 0.02 to 0.03, 
the imputed value of *θ θ−   from equation (17) increases from 0.03 to 0.06 to 0.10. Hence we 
show that the empirical findings in the main text can be readily explained by just the lack of 
coordination between firms alone, without even resorting to those between workers and 
between firms and workers. 
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Although the model does not incorporate employee churning or quitting, an analogy can be 
made. The cost of separation for an average worker is positively related to the amount of 
FSHC she has accumulated and, hence, negatively related to the rate of quitting. On the other 
side, the probability of this worker to find a job with a better match is positively related on 
the availability of those jobs and, therefore, other workers’ willingness to quit their jobs. 
Consequently, the quitting rate in an uncoordinated labour market will, again, be higher than 
that in a coordinated market.  
A further analogy can also be made to the coordination between firms and employees. If 
firms are more willing to lay off incumbents and create vacancies, with coordination, it 
should encourage workers to quit their jobs, and vice versa. Obviously, incorporating the 
coordination problems between workers and between firms and workers will only further 
strengthen the results obtained herein. 
Lastly, the comparative statics results of equations (11) to (16) have some other empirical 
implications. Firstly, it is expected that staff in smaller firms incur relatively more FSHC than 
their counterparts in larger firms, because there are less opportunities for specialization by 
occupation. Secondly, the cost of firing and hiring is likely to be smaller (relative to output 
price) for a bigger firm. Thirdly, as the size of a firm grows, it has more influence over the 
(segmented) labour market in its own sector. These imply that turnover rate should be 
positively related to firm size. However, there is a possible counteracting element in that a 
bigger firm also has a larger internal labour market and, therefore, is more ready to use 
reshuffling to substitute for turnover. 
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